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News outlets cannot serve as reliable conveyors of social facts, nor do their audiences crave such content.
Nonetheless, much political science scholarship assumes that objective information about social, political, and
economic topics is routinely transmitted to the mass public through the news. This article addresses the problem of
selection bias in news content and illustrates the problem with a content analytic study of New York Times
coverage given to American war deaths in five major conflicts that occurred over the past century. We find that
news coverage of war deaths is unrelated to how many American combatants have recently died. News coverage is
more likely to mention war deaths when reporting combat operations and less likely to mention them when a war is
going well. These findings underscore the need to document selection biases in information flows before theorizing
about proximate causes underlying the relationships between political systems and public opinion.
W
alter Lippmann long ago chided those
students of politics who assumed that
‘‘men took in their facts as they took in their
breath’’ (1922, 164). The problem, Lippmann pointed
out, is that facts have no wings. They must be trans-
mitted through space and time, a process traditionally
carried out by the mass media. But news outlets have
neither incentive nor ability to serveas reliable conveyors
of social facts. Nor dotheir audiences crave such content.
News outlets, as Lippmann pointed out, serve their
own logic, and the logic of the news business creates
important limits to both what can be broadly known
through the news and who is likely to know it.
This observation remains unheeded in many
areas of political science research. A wide range of
political science scholarship still proceeds as if mass
publics responded to ‘‘real world’’ events and con-
ditions. Few individuals have a direct view of events,
and so most people respond instead to the mediated
realities constructed for them by news outlets (e.g.,
Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010; Gilens 1999;
Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen 2006). Information tech-
nologies are now so tightly woven into the fabric of
daily life that communication scholars can seriously
discuss the ‘‘mediation of everything’’ (Livingstone
2009), and yet many areas of political science research
still proceed as if the mediation process itself can be
ignored or assumed away.
Political science scholarship that touches on
public opinion processes often assumes that social,
political, and economic facts are routinely transmitted to
the mass public, presumably through mainstream media
channels. For instance, scholars of American politics
often use economic indicators to predict presidential
support without considering how these indicators are
framed or passed along to the public (e.g., MacKuen,
Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck
2001). Assuming rather than analyzing the transmis-
sion of facts reduces the analytical problem to empiri-
cally assessing whether the dynamics of objective facts
known to the researcher correlate with the dynamics of
measured opinions or behaviors. But this simplifying
assumption ignores the problem of selection bias in
the information conveyed to mass audiences. News
media tend to present a view of reality filtered by
criteria of newsworthiness, the organizational routines
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for gathering newsworthy information, and the eco-
nomic incentives of the news business. These factors
systematically distort the transmission of factual in-
formation and may create a disjuncture between
objective, ‘‘real-world’’ indicators and the information
that is made available to mass publics through in-
formational media.
A sizeable literature confirms that news coverage
provides a highly selective account of reality (e.g.,
Danzger 1975; Jackman and Boyd 1979; Dixon and
Linz 2000; Dearing and Rogers 1996; Franzosi 1987;
for recent reviews, see Earl et al. 2004; Gilliam et al.
1996; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005;
Woolley 2000). Yet many research literatures in
political science still proceed as if the news media
provide a sort of ‘‘magic mirror’’ service for the
mass public that is not in itself worthy of attention
or concern. The statistical models used in many public
opinion studies often include ‘‘objective’’ covariates
like economic indicators or casualty counts that are
used to predict values of dependent variables derived
from surveys of individual citizens. This modeling
choice assumes that the survey respondents have
unobstructed access to the facts being modeled, even
though exposure to these facts is rarely confirmed. This
choice also requires assuming that the facts are com-
municated widely enough in a society that they could
serve as a proximal influence on changes in public
opinion. If either assumption fails to hold, then the
meaning of any statistical relationship between factual
inputs and attitudinal outputs must be held in doubt
until alternative mechanisms of influence can be
identified. The practical upshot of unobserved selection
bias affecting the information conveyed to mass publics
will be misleading analyses and flawed theories.
This article examines the problem of selection
bias in news coverage with a content analytic study
on the ways that war casualties have been communi-
cated to American citizens through the news.1 Since
the publication of John Mueller’s (1973) innovative
work on war and public opinion, it has become an
article of faith among scholars of international
relations and public opinion that the willingness of
citizens to support wars is shaped by information
about the human costs of war. A scholarly consensus
has emerged that the dynamics of American war
support appear to be driven by a sort of cost-benefit
calculus (e.g., Eichenberg 2005; Larson 1996; Larson
and Savych 2005). The number of war deaths suffered
by American forces plays an important (albeit con-
tested, e.g., Berinsky 2007; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
2005) role at the heart of this calculus.
Empirically, we know that popular support for
war tends to decrease as war deaths increase (e.g.,
Mueller 1973, 2005). Theoretically, the war support
literature often interprets this pattern as evidence
that the American public perceives fewer benefits
from war as its human costs mount. This presumed
relationship is usually tested with aggregate data, using
time-series models predicting war support as a func-
tion of the actual occurrence of American war deaths,
or with experiments that ensure subjects are exposed
to casualty information (e.g., Gartner 2008; Gelpi
2010). However, ordinary Americans learn about
casualties not from time-series datasets or from
experimental interventions but from news coverage.
Our analysis of casualty reporting from World
War I through the Iraq War shows that the amount
of newspaper attention to the human costs of war has
remained remarkably stable over the past century.
Roughly nine in ten newspaper stories about war
avoid even passing reference to American deaths, a
figure that varied hardly at all from World War I
through Vietnam. Mentions of military losses became
slightly less infrequent during the Iraq War, when only
eight in ten war-related stories ignored American
deaths. In contrast to the typical expectation that
public support for war should be sensitive to incre-
mental changes in casualty numbers, our analysis finds
that high numbers of deaths tend to trigger no unusual
attention to casualties in news reports. More impor-
tant, when a war is going well and prospects for
eventual victory are bright, news stories become less
likely to mention American war deaths at all, regard-
less of actual casualty rates. When America suffers
setbacks, news coverage focuses more attention on the
human cost of war. None of these relationships have
ever been anticipated in the war-support literature.
This content analytic study on communicating
the costs of war illustrates an important problem
affecting a wide range of political science research.
Because the news-making process is so complex, and
because the content of news coverage is simultane-
ously shaped by multiple factors that condition one
another in unpredictable ways, there is no general
theory of news selection that could be applied
to predict or correct distortions in the way media
coverage reflects aspects of reality that might interest
political scientists. An understanding of biases in the
transmission process must grow from descriptive
1An online methods appendix containing robustness checks on
the models reported here as well as additional details on the
content analysis and casualty data is available at journals.
cambridge.org/jop. Data and supporting materials necessary to
reproduce the numerical results will be available upon publica-
tion at www.illinois.edu/;salthaus.
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analysis of the information flows that are actually
reaching the mass public. Only when this basic
descriptive research is completed can the insights from
political communication scholarship be used to under-
stand why the news selects some aspects of reality as
newsworthy while ignoring or neglecting others. Once
understood, these dynamics can be explicitly modeled
in a wide range of political science research that has
mistakenly assumed that the mediation of reality in the
news is a simple mirroring process.
Factors Influencing Selection
Bias in News Coverage
Political scientists are now beginning to recognize a
variety of factors that contribute to selection bias in
news coverage. Political communication theories
addressing selection biases in the news-making pro-
cess include Entman’s (2003) cascading activation
model, Bennett’s (2004; Bennett, Lawrence, and
Livingston 2007) indexing model, and Wolfsfeld’s
(2004) press-media-politics model. All three models
recognize that because there is no simple explanation
for why the news reports what it does, it is difficult to
generalize about what kinds of stories will be covered
in what ways under what conditions. Rather than
making predictions about specific topics likely to be
covered in the news, these three models seek instead
to document general tendencies in news coverage
produced by the complex arrangement of interde-
pendent systems, structures, and influences that
jointly shape the selection of news stories. These
models in turn draw from a large and venerable
literature that details a number of enduring influen-
ces on news selection. We focus on six factors among
these enduring influences that are important for
understanding selection bias in news coverage: the
current political context, the institutional focus and
geographic structure of the news-gathering system,
the nature of the news event, audience tastes, news
values that structure mainstream news reporting, and
the fixed size of the news hole for traditional media.
The Current Political Context
Journalists come to define newsworthiness against a
backdrop of changing perceptions about what is
politically important and changing expectations about
what is likely to happen next. Political context therefore
has an important role to play in news story selection
(e.g., Rosenstiel 2005; Schiffer 2008). The climate of
opinion among elites and the mass public steers news
organizations toward reporting stories that derive their
news value against the backdrop of current perceptions
(e.g., Bennett 1996; Gitlin 1980; Hallin 1986). The
apparent newsworthiness of a political decision or
event can therefore vary across time and across differ-
ent political contexts. In this way, journalistic percep-
tions of newsworthiness are constantly reshaped by
changing perceptions of ‘‘what’s current’’ in politics at
the local, regional, national, and international levels.
The Institutional Focus of the
News-Gathering System
News gathering is an inherently uncertain business,
because it is often difficult to anticipate what each
day’s news will be. The reporter who returns from an
assignment empty-handed is a major risk for news
outlets that must maximize the efficient allocation of
costly news-gathering resources. This concern has
evolved a news-gathering system that maximizes the
potential for generating useful news on a continual
basis (e.g., Cook 2005; Sigal 1973; Sparrow 1999).
The news-gathering system can be thought of as a net
that concentrates journalistic resources at institutional
sites known to reliably generate newsworthy stories
(Tuchman 1978). The main strands of the news net
intersect at strategically important locations—primarily,
governmental institutions designed to register and solve
social problems—and consist of beat reporters from
wire services and national news outlets (e.g., Kaniss
1991; Molotch and Lester 1974). By ‘‘routinizing the
unexpected’’ (Tuchman 1973), institutional tracking
allows news organizations to produce a predictable
and steady stream of useable news stories without
exposing those organizations to the potential risk of
coming back empty-handed at the end of the day.
Shadowing the activities of key government in-
stitutions allows news organizations to make news
cheaply and efficiently, but these gains come at a cost.
While institutional tracking systems thoroughly
document the activities of governing officials, they
tend to neglect or ignore other potentially important
stories that fail to ring institutional alarm bells. In this
way, the activity of elected political leaders focuses
news attention on some stories and away from
others by providing cues about newsworthy topics.
The practical upshot is known as ‘‘indexing’’ by the
news: when it comes to political issues, news comes to
be defined as whatever public institutions with power
are talking about at a given moment (e.g., Bennett 1990;
Hallin 1986). Institutional silence is taken by journalists
as a signal that a topic is unworthy of news attention.
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The Geographic Structure of the
News-Gathering System
Besides shadowing the activities of key actors in
governing institutions, the news-gathering system
also concentrates journalistic resources in particular
parts of the country and world where newsworthy
events are expected to routinely occur (e.g., Kaniss
1991; Tuchman 1978). The uneven geographical
allocation of news-gathering resources produced by
the structure of the news net generates dispropor-
tionate news attention for a small number of central
cities and strategically important countries (e.g.,
Schiff 1996; Wu 2000). As a result, important stories
occurring in places far from permanent news bureaus
are less likely to be reported than those that occur
nearby (e.g., Bendix and Liebler 1999; Branton and
Dunaway 2009; Martin 1988). For example, protests
are more likely to generate news coverage when they
occur in cities that have a wire service office (Danzger
1975). So story selection is influenced not only by
whatever problems are being actively debated by
political leaders but also by whatever problems are
afflicting a small number of key countries and major
cities where news organizations have committed
scarce news-gathering resources.
The Nature of the News Event
To be reported as news, any potential story topic
must first usually take the form of an event that
happens in time and space. As Lippmann noted, ‘‘the
news is not a mirror of social conditions, but the
report of an aspect that has obtruded itself’’ (1922,
216). Usually, the obtruding aspect of social reality
must be an event that is noticed by governing
institutions at the intersecting strands of the news
net. It is the occurrence of an event rather than
merely the existence of an underlying problem that
triggers news attention. Such events are often called
‘‘news pegs’’ because they provide an anchoring
rationale on which to hang subsequent news cover-
age. News pegs provided by governing institutions are
an important determinant of news attention because
it is more efficient for news organizations to passively
track institutions than to independently investigate
social trends or problems on their own (e.g., Gans
1979; Sigal 1973).
‘‘Routine events’’ like press conferences and public
speeches generate news pegs that prompt beat reporters
to write stories about the topics that news makers are
promoting. In addition to these routine events, report-
ers also find particular value in a second category of
‘‘accidental events’’ that attract the notice of social
institutions but are not created by news makers to
promote an institution’s issue agenda (Molotch and
Lester 1974). Accidental events include natural disasters,
scandals, crimes, and domestic or international crises.
Dramatic and unexpected events allow reporters to
break away from the typical constraints imposed by the
institutional news net (e.g., Bennett and Lawrence 1995;
Lawrence 1996). Accidental events empower journalists
to define the news on their own terms, to glimpse how
institutions respond to problems when the veil of spin
is temporarily lifted, and to verify claims made by
political leaders about the nature of social problems as
well as the ability of those leaders to solve the problems
(Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007). For this
reason, news organizations often perceive accidental
events to be even more newsworthy than routine events.
Audience Tastes
The news is a business, and like any other, the
economic incentives and constraints inherent in news
making influence which stories are selected for
publication (Baker 2002). Because most of the rev-
enue in the news business comes from advertising,
news content is selected to hold the attention of large
and demographically desirable audiences such as
women and younger people (Hamilton 2004; Napoli
2003). As a result, news content tends to highlight
topics that interest these economically desirable
audience segments and to ignore topics that risk
alienating these groups. More generally, the limited
interest that mass-circulation audiences have shown
for political topics tends to produce news coverage
that tries to be interesting without being offensive or
hard to understand. News organizations therefore
become wary of covering stories that risk boring the
audience or that demand more effort to understand
than audiences are predisposed to give.
The profitability of mass-audience news outlets
hinges not on retaining the small but loyal audience
of news junkies, but on attracting a larger and more
lucrative marginal audience of people who are some-
what indifferent about public affairs news (Hamilton
2004). Facts that upset these audiences will tend to be
underreported (e.g., Aday 2010), and stories that risk
alienating them will be passed over quickly to empha-
size the content that they find interesting (Zaller
1999). At the same time, the need to hold the interest
of marginal audiences can come into conflict with the
tendency to report on whatever governing institu-
tions happen to be talking about, which adds to the
unpredictability of news content.
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News Values that Structure
Mainstream Reporting
News is defined not only in its proximity to where
beat reporters happen to be in the news net, but also
more generally in terms of what journalists
call ‘‘news value’’ (e.g., Gans 1979; Graber 2009;
Wolfsfeld 2004). Standard elements of ‘‘news value’’
include timeliness (news is something that just hap-
pened), novelty (news is something that is unusual or
out of the ordinary rather than typical and expected),
geographic proximity (news is something that happens
close to where audiences reside), familiarity (audien-
ces are more interested in the doings of familiar
persons like the president or Hollywood stars than of
abstract social trends or anonymous institutions
like Congress), audience impact (audiences are more
interested in things that affect them directly and in
important ways than in things that have a tangential
relationship to daily life), and drama (dramatic
stories are more interesting to follow and conflict
stories are more easily told). News organizations use
these values as a triage system to determine which
among several potentially newsworthy stories they
should cover. The more news value a story has—that
is, the more of these elements present in a given story
topic—the more likely it will be reported.
Each of the news values contributes to selection
bias, but drama and novelty are especially important
(e.g., Weaver et al. 2007; Wolfsfeld 2004). Conflicts
between powerful leaders, groups, or countries will
tend to be reported more heavily than other topics
lacking dramatic conflict. And since there are more
conflicts than journalists could possibly cover, the
news value of these conflicts is often shaped by their
perceived novelty. For example, despite the prevalence
of dramatic civil wars, humanitarian crises, and ethnic
cleansing campaigns in the African continent, Amer-
ican news media tend to ignore Africa altogether as a
source of international news (Golan 2008). The reason
seems to be that such dramatic events are more
common in Africa than in other parts of the world,
and this greatly reduces the news value of reporting on
‘‘yet another crisis’’ in a crisis-prone continent.
The centrality of drama and novelty as news values
is closely tied to the need for attracting and holding the
attention of politically ambivalent marginal audiences.
A Gresham’s Law in mainstream news coverage is the
typical result: unusual and dramatic stories tend to
receive more coverage than routine and sedate stories,
thereby reducing the overall amount of sober coverage
given to unexceptional but nonetheless important
aspects of public affairs like legislative policymaking.
Fixed Size of the News Hole for
Traditional Media
If the time or space in which to report the news was
unlimited, then even stories possessing few elements of
news value might still be reported. In such a case, the
carrying capacity of any outlet’s news agenda would be
equal to the number of stories produced by its
reporting staff in a given news cycle. This is how the
news agenda is constructed in many Internet news
outlets. However, television broadcasts and printed
newspapers are different. These traditional outlets have
a fixed amount of time or space for reporting news
that must be shared with the advertising that finances
news-gathering activities (e.g., Hamilton 2004; Picard
1989). A certain number of newspaper pages and
minutes per hour on television must be devoted to
ads, and the size of the ‘‘news hole’’—the remaining
amount of time or space set aside for news items—is
usually invariant over the short run regardless of
what’s happening on a given day. On slow news days,
the reporting staff may scramble to find enough items
to fill the news hole. On busy news days, editors and
producers must make difficult choices about which
newsworthy stories must go unreported due to
constraints on the time or space available for trans-
mitting news reports. The relatively fixed size of the
news hole is therefore an important factor produc-
ing selection bias in news coverage (e.g., Fogarty
2005; Haider-Markel, Allen, and Johansen 2006;
Nam 2006; Ortiz et al. 2005).
News organizations sometimes precommit sec-
tions of the news hole to an ongoing topic. News
reports that address the latest development in a long-
running saga such a war, scandal, or a high-profile
legislative debate are known as ‘‘continuing stories’’
(Molotch and Lester 1974). When continuing stories
are allocated a regular space in the news hole, the
amount of coverage that can be devoted to other topics
is reduced. Within the portion of the news hole set
aside for a continuing story, only the most newsworthy
dimensions of the continuing story will be reported.
A Content Analytic Study on
Communicating the Costs of War
The previous section identified some of the main
factors that drive news selection effects. But identify-
ing factors does not help us forecast how those factors
will shape the reporting of a given story or topic. In
part this is because so little descriptive research has
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been done on most areas of news attention that
political communication scholars have no clear idea
how selection biases in the reporting of facts and
events might vary by topical area. In part this is
because the news selection process is dynamic and
complex, with multiple influences joining together at
different stages to direct journalistic attention away
from some issues and toward others. The inherent
unpredictability of the news selection process
underscores why it is important for political science
research to empirically describe a given transmission
process before proceeding to the theory-testing stage.
Understanding how an event affects public opin-
ion requires understanding how that event is com-
municated to the mass public. War offers a prime
example of the need for doing so, since few citizens
directly experience a military conflict, yet their
mediated experience of war has important implica-
tions for public policy and public opinion. Although
the political science literature on popular support for
war implies that references to American war deaths in
the news should closely follow the actual number of
recent war deaths, the literature on selection bias in
the news suggests a different set of expectations.
Few leaders are likely to benefit politically by
focusing institutional attention on American military
losses while a war is raging. The institutional focus
and geographic structure of the news-gathering sys-
tem suggests that if government and military leaders
aren’t actively debating the human costs of war, then
news media are unlikely to draw attention to those
costs unless other factors intervene to increase the
newsworthiness of the topic (e.g., Aday 2010; Cobb
2007). Although it is difficult to anticipate all the
conditions that might prompt journalists to highlight
the costs of war even when those costs are not being
actively debated by civilian and military leaders, four
factors seem especially plausible.
First, because wars are treated as continuing stories,
news outlets will tend to reserve a portion of their news
hole for daily updates on the war. The rigid structure of
the news hole may leave little room for news coverage
of casualties to vary as a function of the number of war
deaths. To the contrary, as casualties become a routine
part of war coverage, journalists should tend to reserve
a regular (and probably small) amount of the news hole
for casualty stories as one among many war-related
topics competing for coverage.
Second, novelty as a news value should regulate
news attention to casualties independently of elite
debate in at least two ways. American casualties will
be an unusual and therefore newsworthy topic at the
outset of a war, regardless of what elites are talking
about. But as the war continues, additional deaths
become routine features of the ongoing conflict,
diminishing their novelty and potential newsworthi-
ness in the eyes of journalists. So news coverage of
casualties should wane with elapsed time in a war. In
addition, the news value of novelty should also
produce reporting that is more sensitive to trends in
casualty rates than to actual numbers of casualties, even
in periods with steady losses, and even if those losses
involve large numbers of American dead. Increases in
casualty rates should be relatively more dramatic than
decreases in casualty rates. As a result, news coverage
may be especially likely to mention American war
deaths when casualty rates are rising (that is, when new
casualty information is both novel and dramatic), and
relatively less likely to mention American losses when
casualty rates are falling (that is, when new casualty
information may be novel but relatively less dramatic).
Third, the current political context of a war, in
combination with audience tastes regarding war
coverage, could influence whether and how news
coverage mentions casualties (e.g., Wolfsfeld, Frosh,
and Awabdy 2008). A long line of literature suggests
that critical war reporting is kept in check by the
tastes of audiences who prefer positive or neutral
coverage of an ongoing war to negative coverage. As
a result, news of war is rarely critical about the
justifications for war and tends to avoid coverage
of friendly war deaths altogether (e.g., Aday 2005;
Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007; Carruthers
2000; Hallin 1986; Knightley 2004; Mermin 1999).
Against this backdrop, the public support for war
literature expects that as political leaders become
divided over the merits of war, news coverage should
become more critical toward the war (e.g., Berinsky
2009; Hallin 1986; Larson 1996; Zaller 1992). It is
likely that such critical coverage might include more
attention to the human costs of war. However, since
elite divisions should be more likely the longer a war
goes on, in practice it becomes difficult to separate
the effects of elite opinion on war coverage inde-
pendently from the effects of mounting numbers
of cumulative casualties, or any other factor that is
correlated with the passage of time (e.g., Lai and
Reiter 2005). We therefore examine a different
indicator of current political context: signals carried
in news coverage about whether a war is likely to be
won or lost (Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi, Feaver,
and Reifler 2005, 2009). The prior literature has
neglected how cues about the likelihood of eventual
victory are conveyed in the news, and so we have no
directional expectations for this relationship. But it
seems plausible that current perceptions about
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whether the war can be won—shaped by elite cues
and carried into the news through indexing—provide
an important context for assessing the newsworthi-
ness of additional casualties.
Finally, because some aspects of war are inherently
more dramatic than others, the relative availability of
dramatic war stories should influence what informa-
tion about the conflict appears in the portion of the
news hole devoted to war coverage. Stories describing
combat operations should be especially dramatic
relative to other aspects of war that might be reported.
Given a fixed amount of space or time for reporting
the day’s war news, dramatic stories about combat
operations should tend to crowd out stories about
other aspects of war, such as developments on the
home front or routine speeches by war leaders. To the
extent that war deaths are covered in their own stories,
heightened news attention to combat operations could
displace casualty coverage within the daily news hole.
However, because most war deaths result from fight-
ing, it may be that descriptions of combat operations
should tend to mention casualties. If so, then height-
ened attention to combat operations could increase
the likelihood that casualties are mentioned in the
news. For this reason, while combat coverage should
have a bearing on casualty coverage, we have no
directional expectations for the relationship between
combat coverage and mentions of American deaths.
In short, we do not expect to find support for the
conventional view implied by the war support liter-
ature that mentions of American losses in the news
should be positively related to the actual numbers of
recent war dead. In contrast, we expect that:
d Attention to American losses should be relatively
stable within wars, regardless of the actual numbers
of recent casualties.
d Attention to American losses in the news should be
more frequent earlier than later in a war, and when
the number of American war deaths is rising more
than when it is falling.
d Attention to American losses should be related
to current assessments of the likelihood of eventual
victory.
d Attention to American losses should be related
to the proportion of daily war stories describing
combat operations.
Data Sources for Newspaper Coverage
We used a stratified random sampling procedure to
select every war-related story in sampled days of New
York Times coverage from World War I, World War
II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq
War. Because the topical agenda of national news
outlets is fairly homogenous, the Times is often used
as a proxy to represent larger trends in national news
content (e.g., Danielian and Reese 1989; Golan 2006).
Few Americans read the Times directly, but it is one
of the few American newspapers available in elec-
tronic form all the way back to the early days of the
twentieth century, and the only newspaper with an
index covering the entire period that can be used to
authoritatively identify the population of war-related
stories.
Following standard procedures for daily news-
papers (Riffe, Aust, and Lacy 1993; Riffe, Lacy, and
Fico 1998, 97–101), we sampled one constructed
week of coverage for each year of a war using a
random sample of days across elapsed months within
wars. Our sampling strategy randomly captures
roughly every 60th day of each war, rotating through
the days of the week, which results in larger sub-
samples for longer wars. Data reported in this article
include 10 randomly sampled days of news coverage
yielding 160 war-related stories from the period of
American involvement in World War I (April 2, 1917
to November 11, 1918), 20 sampled days yielding 737
war-related stories from the period of American
involvement in World War II (December 7, 1941 to
September 2, 1945), 18 days yielding 214 stories from
the Korean War (June 25, 1950 to July 25, 1953), 49
days yielding 509 stories from the Vietnam War
(considered to have begun with the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution, passed on August 7, 1964, and to have
ended on March 29, 1973, when American combat
troops left South Vietnam), and 28 sampled days
yielding 357 war-related stories from the Iraq War
(March 19, 2003 through November 1, 2006, when
we began collecting data for this project).
With the final sample in hand, we used the New
York Times Index to identify all war-related stories
published on each sampled day. We then coded every
war story within each day using full-text, scanned
images of news stories obtained from ProQuest’s
Historical New York Times database.2 All war-related
content was included in the analysis, including
editorials and opinion columns, but excluding letters
to the editor since the Times Index only began listing
all letters to the editor in the mid-1980s (Althaus,
Edy, and Phalen 2001). This procedure identified a
2Full-text stories from Nexis-Lexis were used to code Times
coverage from the Iraq War, as the ProQuest holdings ended in
late 2003 at the time the coding for this project was conducted.
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total of 1,977 war stories published in the 125 days
sampled for the present analysis.
Within each war-related story, coders recorded
every mention of war deaths among friendly forces, as
well as whether the story included numerical data on
cumulative deaths or mentioned trends in numbers
of recent deaths. Stories coded as mentioning casu-
alties were not necessarily stories ‘‘about’’ casualties,
though many were. Mentions of casualties captured
by our coders therefore range from long numeri-
cal reports of recent battle casualties to brief,
offhand remarks about ‘‘our losses’’ in editorials or
op-ed articles. Coders also noted when stories de-
scribed combat operations. To assess story-level cues
about the likelihood of eventual victory, five coding
categories were developed to capture different types
of information relevant to the likely outcome of a
war: the apparent military power of enemy forces, the
apparent military power of allied forces, a measure of
which side had the military initiative, a measure
assessing which side was likely to win the war, and
a measure of whether the story contained mostly
good news or bad news for the United States and its
allies. Separate coding variables were collected using
these five measures, but a principal components
analysis later revealed a single factor solution with
strong loadings for all five items (Eigenvalue 5 2.86).
As a consequence, we scaled all five variables to a
common metric (after reverse-coding the enemy
strength variable) and averaged them into an aggre-
gated estimate of the war’s likely outcome (Cronbach’s
alpha5 .81). This combined measure of the likelihood
of victory runs from –1 to +1, with negative values
representing an anticipated defeat and positive values
indicating a likely victory.
Because of the complex alliances that the United
States made in each of these wars, we considered
friendly deaths as losses incurred either by American
forces or by the forces of its allies. For instance,
coders were instructed to count reports of British
casualties during World War II or ARVN forces
during the Vietnam War as mentions of friendly
casualties. In practice, however, despite casting a
broad net we found that nearly all mentions of
friendly casualties made during periods of American
involvement referred to U.S. casualties alone—few
stories mentioned casualties of allied nations without
also mentioning American losses. For this reason,
throughout the analysis that follows we consistently
refer to friendly deaths as American deaths.
Five coders carried out the content analysis after
extensive training and reliability testing. A final
reliability test using five coders and 161 stories was
conducted prior to the start of the initial data-
collection process. After the initial data collection
process, a second round of reliability testing was
conducted using two coders and the 192 stories that
included numerical or individual references to Amer-
ican dead (another 18 stories made other types of
references and were not included in this test).
Average pairwise agreement across coders ranged
from 87% to 97% across the nominal-level variables
used in this analysis, with minimum pairwise agree-
ment ranging from 74% to 87% across all combina-
tions of five coders. The interval-level likelihood of
eventual victory measure had an average pairwise
correlation of .80 across coders and a minimum
pairwise correlation of .70. We also calculated inter-
coder reliability statistics, which represent the percent
agreement above what can be expected by chance
(additional details on agreement and intercoder
reliability measures are available in the online appen-
dix). All content variables used in this analysis have
acceptable levels of intercoder reliability, achieving at
least a .70 level of reliability with either Brennan and
Prediger’s (1981) kappa or Krippendorff’s (2004)
alpha, as appropriate.
Data Sources for American War Deaths
Trends in Korean War deaths were derived from the
Korean Combat Casualty File, 1950–57, while those for
the Vietnam War come from the Southeast Asia
Combat Area Casualties File.3 Casualty data for the Iraq
War comes from official Department of Defense data
compiled by the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count web site
(www.icasualties.org). Trends in American deaths from
World War I and World War II were estimated from
government casualty reports published regularly in the
Times. See the online appendix for details on how trend
data for the world wars were compiled.
What Drives Coverage of
American War Deaths?
Although friendly casualties play a central role in
most studies of public support for war, we find that
news coverage rarely mentions those casualties. War
news contained no mention of American fatalities on
20% of sampled days. On days when American deaths
were noted, such references were often brief and most
stories made no mention of them at all. Across all five
3The authors are grateful to Scott Gartner for making these data
files available to us.
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wars, American war deaths were mentioned in an
average of 1.7 stories per day (out of an average of
15.8 war-related stories per day), which means that
only 11% of war-related stories on an average day
made even passing reference to American deaths.
Figure 1 presents the percentage of war stories
from each conflict that made at least passing refer-
ence to American war deaths. Overall news attention
to American deaths has increased somewhat over the
past century. American losses were noted in nearly
one in five war-related stories from the Iraq War,
compared to only one in 10 stories from World War
I. Yet the types of casualty information assumed by
political scientists to influence public support for war
were rarely published in Times coverage. Out of the
nearly 2,000 stories in our sample, only 41 mentioned
the cumulative number of American deaths since the
start of a war, and only 16 explicitly compared num-
bers of American deaths across time within a war.
Figure 1 shows just how rare these types of references
are: on average across the five wars, only 2% of war-
related stories mention cumulative deaths, and less
than 1% of stories mention numerical trends in
American deaths. With regard to reporting trends in
American losses over time, further analysis shows that
only 13% of sampled days across the five wars cont-
ained such information, and in every case those few
days contained only a single story that compared losses
at different points in time within a war.
With regard to cumulative death tolls, before the
Iraq War only 15% of sampled days contained a story
that mentioned the total number of American losses
since the start of a war. Only one of these sampled
days had more than one story that mentioned the
cumulative death toll. In contrast, during the Iraq
War, cumulative American losses were noted in 64%
of sampled days, and one-third of these cases were
days that contained more than one story mentioning
the cumulative death toll (four sampled days con-
tained two stories that mentioned cumulative deaths,
while one sampled day contained four such stories).
But of the 25 Iraq War stories mentioning cumulative
deaths, two-thirds (n 5 16) were ‘‘Names of the
Dead’’ casualty lists rather than regular news stories.
This means that even during the Iraq War, typical
readers would be unlikely to come across mentions of
cumulative casualties unless they were in the habit of
reading ‘‘Names of the Dead’’ lists, brief items that in
our sample were usually buried in the middle of the
first section (mean page number5 12). If we set such
lists aside, only 3% of the remaining war-related
stories and 25% of sampled days during the Iraq War
mentioned cumulative losses.
In short, reporting of trend data on American
deaths remains just about as rare today as it was
during World War I. And although Iraq appears to
stand out in Figure 1 as having more than three times
the attention drawn to cumulative deaths than in
previous wars, this is mainly an artifact of the Times
having adopted a new convention to report cumu-
lative deaths when publishing ‘‘Names of the Dead’’
lists. Setting those lists aside, information about
cumulative losses was just about as hard to find
during the Iraq War as during previous conflicts.
Part of the reason for similar numbers of casualty
mentions across wars has to do with the size of the
news hole devoted to war coverage by the Times.
Aside from World War II, when the Times ran an
average of 36.9 stories about the war per sampled day
(s.d. 5 9.6), each of the other four wars was allocated
roughly the same-sized daily news hole: an average
day’s news from the period of American involvement
in World War I contained 16.0 war-related stories
(s.d. 5 5.8), which was about the same as in the
Korean War (mean 5 11.9 war-related stories, s.d. 5
5.2), the Vietnam War (mean5 10.4, s.d.5 5.1), and
the Iraq War (mean 5 12.7, s.d. 5 10.8). When
World War II is omitted from the comparison, a one-
way analysis of variance for the daily number of war-
related stories across the other four wars reveals no
statistically significant differences, F (3, 102) 5 1.95,
p 5 .13. This suggests that the fixed size of the news
hole may go a long ways toward accounting for the
similarities in casualty mentions across wars shown in
Figure 1.
It is also notable that the relatively larger news
hole allocated by the Times to World War II coverage
did not produce increased attention to war-related
deaths. To the contrary, the average number of
FIGURE 1 Percentage of War Stories Mentioning
American Deaths, by Type of
Reference
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stories per sampled day that mentioned American
losses was quite similar across all five wars: 2.2 stories
per day from World War II mentioned U.S. war
deaths (s.d.5 2.1), compared to 1.6 from World War
I (s.d. 5 .97), 1.1 from the Korean War (s.d. 5 1.1),
1.3 from the Vietnam War (s.d. 5 1.0), and 2.5
stories per day from the Iraq War (s.d.5 2.4). A one-
way analysis of variance for daily number of stories
mentioning American losses across wars confirmed a
significant difference, F (4, 120) 5 3.61 p , .01, but
post hoc contrasts showed that only the differences
between Iraq and Vietnam and between Iraq and
Korea were statistically significant. Not only did the
Times set aside a fixed amount of news space for war
coverage generally, the Times also reserved a relatively
fixed amount of that news space for stories mention-
ing war deaths. Quite in keeping with standard news
practices and probably unrelated to any editorial
stance about these wars, this tendency placed a filter
on casualty news so that it became a small and
relatively stable component of coverage across wars
despite the wide variance in losses actually sustained
in these wars.
To determine what drives newspaper coverage of
casualties, we now turn to a regression analysis that
predicts mentions of American deaths in the news.
Because cumulative deaths and casualty trend com-
parisons are so rarely included in Times coverage, no
multiple regression analysis could be conducted on
those types of casualty references. Our analysis
considers instead any reference to American deaths,
no matter how brief or indirect. As a check on the
robustness of our findings, we conduct the regres-
sions at the level of individual stories (using logistic
regression) and at the level of sampled days (using
OLS regression) from across the five wars.
Following the lead of previous war support
studies (e.g., Gartner 2008; Gartner, Segura, and
Wilkening 1997), we coded the marginal number of
American deaths (in hundreds) occurring in the
30 days leading up to the date of each story as well
as the trend in marginal deaths, coded –1 if the
marginal number of American deaths was falling
relative to the previous 30-day period, +1 if marginal
deaths were rising, and 0 if the marginal death trend
was stable. Because we expected that the relative
novelty of casualties should have an important bear-
ing on the likelihood of casualty coverage, our
models include a counter for elapsed time since the
start of American involvement equal to the number of
years (measured in daily increments) since the United
States entered each war. We also included variables
capturing the daily average likelihood of victory score
for all of the war stories published on the day any
given story appeared. We included the daily average
likelihood of victory score to capture the dynamic
impact of particular stages of wars, since the proba-
bility of casualty coverage could be a function of
how well the war is going: news media might not want
to report more bad news when the outlook is grim, or
conversely might not want to report depressing news of
casualties when victory is in sight. Finally, we also
measured the daily percentage of stories describing
combat operations on the date a given story appeared.
To control for idiosyncratic factors specific to individ-
ual wars, all of the pooled models also contain dummy
variables for each war, using the earliest war in each
pooled group as the reference category.
Table 1 shows how these variables affect the
probability that a given story mentioned American
deaths. The methods appendix contains separate mod-
els for each war as well as several alternative specifica-
tions of these models to confirm that the results
presented in Table 1 are robust. The leftmost columns
in Table 1 contain logistic regressions predicting
mentions of American deaths within individual stories
(DV coded 1 5 mentions US dead, 0 5 otherwise),
while the rightmost columns contain OLS models
predicting the proportion of war stories mentioning
American deaths within sampled days (DV M 5 .11,
s.d. 5 .31, max 5 1, min 5 0). Each set of columns
contains three pooled models: one that combines all
five wars together, one that pools just the two world
wars, and one that pools just the three later wars. Two
main factors warrant our attention to these pooled
models, especially to differences between the two world
wars and the three later wars. First, casualties rose
dramatically over time during both world wars, but
were less highly correlated with time among the three
later wars (see Figures A1 and A2 in the online
appendix). Second, news coverage of both world wars
tended to be relatively optimistic about the chances of
victory, whereas coverage of later wars tended to be
more pessimistic (Althaus et al. 2008). These similar-
ities suggest that the model pooling stories from the
world wars and the model pooling stories from the
later wars are likely to provide the strongest evidence
about factors that drive coverage of American war
deaths. Interested readers can also examine war-specific
models in the methods appendix.
Table 1 shows that newspaper mentions of
American deaths were statistically unrelated to the
actual occurrence of those deaths. Neither the actual
numbers of war deaths in the 30 days leading up to a
story’s publication nor the trends in those deaths
relative to the previous 30 days had a significant
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relationship with the probability of mentioning
American deaths in any of the models. Although we
expected that newspaper mentions of war deaths
should be more sensitive to recent changes in casualty
rates than to actual numbers of deaths, it appears that
the news hole for casualty information is so rigid
during major wars that even casualty trends have no
effect on the likelihood that deaths are mentioned in
the news.
Although casualty coverage across the wars was
independent of rates or trends in actual war deaths,
Table 1 shows that cues about the likelihood of victory
exert a strong impact on casualty coverage across wars.
The level of optimism in daily coverage is negatively
related to mentions of dead Americans, and this
relationship is statistically significant in five of the six
models (in the sixth model, it is correctly signed but
only marginally significant). When the war is going
well and prospects are bright for eventual victory, news
stories become less likely to mention American deaths.
When America suffers setbacks in battle, news atten-
tion shifts to emphasize the human cost of war. The
estimated effects of this variable on the daily propor-
tion of war stories mentioning American deaths can be
read from the rightmost columns of Table 1. Although
the average likelihood of victory variable theoretically
ranges from –1 to +1, averaging these story-level scores
produces a more compact distribution at the level of
sampled days (M 5 .03, s.d.5 .13, max 5 .46, min 5
–.20). When the level of optimism is set to two
standard deviations above the mean, the pooled model
across all wars predicts that American deaths will be
mentioned in 14% fewer stories than they would be if
the likelihood of victory variable were to take the
neutral value of 0. At two standard deviations below
the mean, the pooled model across all wars predicts
that American deaths will be mentioned in 11% more
stories than if cues about the likelihood of victory were
evenly balanced. As the other two pooled OLS models
show, the estimated effect of optimism about the war’s
eventual chances of success was larger in the three
more recent wars (b 5 –.63) than in the two world
wars (b 5 –.25).
The daily proportion of stories mentioning com-
bat is significantly related to whether American
deaths are mentioned in the news. For the wars in
Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, combat coverage is pos-
itively and significantly related to whether American
dead are mentioned in the news at both the story
level and the daily level. In the separate model for the
two world wars, the daily proportion of stories
mentioning combat appears statistically unrelated to
casualty mentions. However, further inspection re-
veals that the nonsignificance of this relationship in
TABLE 1 Predicting Mentions of American Deaths in War Stories
Mentions of American Deaths
in Individual War Stories
Daily Proportion of War
Stories Mentioning American Deaths
All Wars WWI and
WWII
Korea,
Vietnam,
Iraq
All Wars WWI and
WWII
Korea,
Vietnam,
Iraq
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths
In Past 30 Days (100s)
.004†
(.002)
-.003
(.004)
-.008
(.016)
.000
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
-.003
(.002)
Trend In Marginal American
Deaths (–1, 0, +1)
.04
(.09)
.09
(.19)
.04
(.10)
.01
(.01)
.00
(.01)
.01
(.02)
Daily Average Likelihood Of
Victory (–1 - +1)
-3.14*
(.89)
-3.89†
(2.05)
-3.44*
(1.07)
-.47*
(.14)
-.25*
(.11)
-.63*
(.19)
Daily Proportion of Stories
Describing Combat Ops (0 - 1)
1.50*
(.66)
-2.47
(1.60)
2.42*
(.72)
.27*
(.09)
-.05
(.09)
.32*
(.11)
Elapsed Time Since Start Of U.S.
Involvement (Years)
-.05
(.05)
.64*
(.32)
-.06
(.05)
-.01
(.01)
.04
(.02)
-.01
(.01)
Constant -2.18*
(.41)
-2.91*
(1.15)
-2.72*
(.36)
.11†
(.06)
.05
(.07)
.07
(.05)
Log Likelihood -637.0* -209.3* -419.9*
Pseudo R2 / R2 .05 .04 .04 .27 .42 .27
Story N / Day N 1977 897 1080 125 30 95
† p , .10 * p , .05
Note: All models also contain dummy variables for individual wars (not shown). Cells in the left columns contain logistic regression
coefficients and cells in the right columns contain unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
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the two world wars is simply a function of the larger
overall number of combat stories in those wars, the
vast majority of which made no mention of casu-
alties. Chi-square tests (not shown) of whether stories
mention combat and whether they mention Ameri-
can deaths confirm that American deaths were dis-
proportionately more likely to appear in combat
stories during the two world wars, just as in the later
wars. This relationship between casualty reports and
combat coverage helps explain why the Times rarely
mentions cumulative deaths or trends in recent
deaths. Of the 210 stories that mention American
war deaths in our sample, exactly half appear in
stories that also describe combat operations. Because
combat is dramatic and because battles tend to be
covered as they happen (or soon after), much of
the coverage given to American combat deaths comes
as passing references within after-action descriptions
of recent battles. The news hole therefore appears to
be more open to stories about the latest fighting than
to those about the scale of human destruction left in
the wake of fighting.
The relationship between elapsed time and casu-
alty mentions is more complicated. Consistent with
our expectation about the news value of novelty,
elapsed time in a war is negatively related to casualty
mentions in four of the six models. However, none of
these coefficients is statistically significant. In contrast,
during the two world wars American deaths were
more likely to be mentioned in the later stages of
fighting (although this relationship is only significant
at the story level). This could be a simple reflection of
the changing scale of death in those conflicts, where
most battle deaths occurred relatively late in the wars
(see Appendix Figures A1 and A2). For the three more
recent wars, there is no consistent relationship between
elapsed time and marginal casualty rates. But the main
finding from this series of coefficients is that the news
value of novelty has no consistent impact on casualty
coverage during major wars.
Three central conclusions emerge from the var-
ious findings reported here. First, although the
international relations literature expects the public
provision of numerical information about casualties
to be a major factor in eroding public support for
war, this type of information is rarely ever contained
in war-related coverage from what is arguably the
most historically prestigious and information-rich
source of national security news in the United States.
Second, the amount of news coverage given to
American wartime deaths in the New York Times
has no clear or obvious connection to the actual
timing or numbers of those deaths. Third, Times
reporting of American war deaths is instead cali-
brated to the current prospects for eventual victory
and the relative amount of daily news coverage taken
up by stories describing combat operations. Even
then, the amount of variance explained by the right-
hand variables in our models is quite modest. In five
wars distributed across nearly 100 years, the amount
of news attention given to war-related death in the
Times had little to do with the pace or scale of war-
related dying.
A Call for Bringing
Description Back In
Comparing the levels and dynamics of casualty
coverage across major American conflicts of the last
100 years calls into question a wide range of assump-
tions common to the political science literature about
dynamic influences on public opinion processes.
Across five different wars, the New York Times
reported news about war casualties in basically the
same ways. Higher numbers of recent American
deaths did not increase the probability that casualties
would be mentioned in the news. Deaths were more
likely to be reported when stories included details
about combat operations. However, American losses
were less likely to be mentioned when news of the day
was relatively optimistic about the war’s likely chan-
ces of success. In short, these findings reveal that
casualty coverage varies with the journalistic news
value of American losses, rather than simply reflect-
ing the numbers of recent American losses.
These findings confirm what the political commu-
nication subfield has long known: routine transmission
of politically important information should never be
assumed. The news media provide a selective account
of reality, largely chosen to reflect audience tastes and
journalists’ ever-shifting sense of newsworthiness. Be-
cause of this, ‘‘even the most careful and complete
journalistic accounts appear to present a partial and
often biased representation of large, irregular, and
important events’’ (Woolley 2000, 170). No researcher
should ever assume that events or publicly available
information like casualty counts are covered ‘‘as is’’ by
major news organizations (Ortiz et al. 2005). Selection
biases in war coverage probably take different forms
than selection biases in other types of reporting, so it
would be difficult to generalize from this particular
case. But this study illustrates why political scientists
need to begin concerning themselves with a third type
of black box problem.
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The Other Problem with Black Boxes
‘‘Black box’’ models of policymaking and public
opinion have long been criticized for their intellec-
tual blandness: inputs go in and outputs come out
without ever delving into the between parts. What
happens in the middle is what’s really interesting,
but that’s precisely what ‘‘black box’’ models leave
out. Sometimes it’s because the sausage-making
process in policy institutions and individual minds
is hard to observe, but often what happens in the
middle is left out because data about the middle
processes simply don’t exist. When this is the case,
the researcher often falls back to studying covariance
between the ‘‘stimulus’’ of objectively measured
inputs and the ‘‘response’’ of objectively measured
outputs as a way of drawing inferences about
plausible but hidden pathways that might connect
them.
Two kinds of black box problems are already
familiar in the discipline: black boxes at the level of
systems and black boxes at the level of individuals. This
article addresses a third type of black box problem:
uncertainty about the content and structure of infor-
mational flows that connect system-level processes to
individual-level processes. The importance of studying
and describing these information flows is little appre-
ciated within our field. Their continued neglect calls
into question a wide range of theories about system-
and individual-level processes rooted in the unlikely
assumption that the observable facts serving as inputs
to our models are communicated widely enough
through a political system that they could serve as a
proximal influence on individual-level opinions.
Assuming the transmission of key facts from
systems to individuals might be a reasonable meth-
odological compromise if the transparency of the
mediation process were confirmed with data. How-
ever, because content analysis is time-consuming and
difficult to conduct, the mediation process is rarely
studied. Aside from the challenge of measuring
information flows, it also seems the case that ‘‘Social
scientists involved in quantitative empirical research
generally are relatively unconcerned with problems of
measurement. Most prefer to get on immediately
with statistical estimation and theory construction’’
(Franzosi 1987, 5). Statistical estimation and theory
construction built on incorrect assumptions will
necessarily produce misleading findings and faulty
explanations. The few public opinion studies to
analyze such processes uniformly conclude that the
mediation process has a profound influence on what
mass publics learn and how they learn it.
By explicitly analyzing how casualty information
is communicated to the American public, this study
draws attention to the importance of moving past
‘‘black box’’ covariance models connecting systems
and individuals to better understand how informa-
tion flows about politics at the system level influence
public reactions at the individual level. Doing so
requires descriptive analysis, often in the form of case
studies (e.g., Franzosi 1987; Woolley 2000). To the
extent that such case studies clarify how selection
biases shape the information flows connecting indi-
viduals to the systems around them, these regularities
can be explicitly modeled in covariance designs and
used to narrow down a feasible set of alternative
explanations of what might be happening within a
given black box context.
Implications for Research on Public
Support for War
The findings from our content analytic study also
shed light on recent theoretical disagreements in the
war support literature about whether the proximal
cause of changes in war support is mounting casu-
alties (following Mueller 1973) or diminishing ex-
pectations of victory (e.g., Feaver and Gelpi 2004;
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). This theoretical
debate centers on the nature of the public’s ‘‘casualty
sensitivity’’ and the degree to which public support
for war is eroded by mounting casualties or some-
thing else that is merely correlated with casualty
counts (e.g., Berinsky 2007; Eichenberg, Stoll, and
Lebo 2006; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005; Mueller
2005). Our findings question the theoretical validity
of using cumulative or marginal counts of American
war dead as a statistical proxy for the war costs that
are actually communicated to the American public.
At the same time, our findings suggest that in practice
it may be hard to separate the communication of
casualty information from the communication of
cues about the prospects for victory, because news
attention to war costs seems to vary as a function of
battlefield successes. Recent work on the apparent
importance of the war’s perceived success as a
moderator of the public’s casualty sensitivity (e.g.,
Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Johnson and Tierney 2006)
might therefore be focusing on the wrong variable.
Because cues about the chances of eventual victory
are correlated with the public visibility of American
losses mentioned in the news, it might be that
perceptions of success are themselves conditioned
on casualty coverage. Further research that models
changes in perceptions of eventual victory with
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changes in the provision of casualty information will
be required to untangle the apparent confound be-
tween these two possible causes of over-time declines
in public support for war.
At a minimum, these findings underscore pre-
vious calls to study the ‘‘flow of influence’’ between
news coverage and public opinion in the foreign
policy context (Seaver 1998). They support the view
articulated by Groeling and Baum that ‘‘even after
controlling for . . . empirical ‘reality,’ communication
still plays a crucial, independent role in influencing
public support for the president during foreign
crises’’ (emphasis in original, Groeling and Baum
2008, 2–3). When communication is taken seriously,
better theories result.
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Sources of Trend Data for American Deaths in the World Wars 
Compared to the relative ease of locating daily counts of American dead in the three most recent 
wars, determining trends in American deaths during the two world wars proved challenging. For World 
War II the only trend data available from government sources are monthly casualty statistics recorded 
by the U.S. Army. These data exclude losses suffered by Navy and Marine personnel. To fill these gaps, 
we combed through the entire range of war-related content in the New York Times and located every 
governmental casualty report published during both world wars. Our analysis of World War II uses the 
Times data rather than the Army data for two reasons: early casualties in World War II came 
disproportionately from the Navy, and Army casualty rates diminished substantially as the European 
campaign wound down in 1945, while Marines (considered a branch of the Navy) and Naval forces 
continued to suffer heavy casualties through VJ Day. For World War II, we found 54 casualty reports 
that included cumulative totals for Army, Navy, and Marine casualties. These reports were published at 
somewhat regular intervals during the war, covering the period from immediately after December 7, 
1941 through August 23, 1945, the date on which casualties from VJ Day (August 15) were publicly 
announced. These reports were spaced an average of 25 days apart, and from them we interpolated daily 
casualty totals using the “ipolate” routine in Stata 9.0. We also interpolated daily measures of 
cumulative American deaths from the official Army statistics, and this series correlates at .993 with the 
combined Army, Navy, and Marine cumulative deaths interpolated from the New York Times reports.  
To our knowledge, no trend data on World War I casualties had ever been collected before we 
undertook this project. For World War I, we found that General Pershing’s official reports of American 
casualties were typically published several times per week in the New York Times. A total of 158 
casualty reports were published between October 20, 1917—when the first American casualty of the 
war was announced—and November 11, 1918. The long delays between when casualties were incurred 
and when they were publicly reported meant that by war’s end, the American public was aware of only 
22,116 of the 116,516 deaths that had occurred among American military forces.1 About half of the 
known combat deaths were reported by the Times during the last six weeks of the war. We used the 
same interpolation procedure to produce daily estimates of known combat deaths as was used for Times 
casualty data from World War II. 
Details on the Reliability Test for the Content Analysis 
Five coders carried out the content analysis after extensive training and reliability testing. A 
reliability test using 161 stories and conducted prior to the initial data collection effort confirmed that 
coders were applying the protocol with acceptable levels of agreement and chance-corrected intercoder 
reliability. After the initial data collection process, a second round of reliability testing was conducted 
using two coders and all 192 stories that had been coded as mentioning American dead (see Table A1 
for complete reliability test results for each variable used in the analysis). For every content variable in 
the analysis, we calculated either the average and minimum levels of pairwise agreement or the average 
and minimum pairwise correlations across all combinations of our five coders using PRAM reliability 
testing software (Neuendorf 2002). Average pairwise agreement across coders ranged from 99% to 
87%, and minimum pairwise agreement ranged from 98% to 74%. The likelihood of eventual victory 
measure had an average pairwise correlation of .80 across coders and a minimum pairwise correlation of 
.70. Besides measures of “raw” agreement, we also calculated intercoder reliability statistics, which 
represent the percent agreement above what can be expected by chance (see the appendix for detailing 
agreement and intercoder reliability measures for each content variable). For nominal and ordinal 
variables, the measures of minimum pairwise agreement were used to calculate Brennan and Prediger’s 
kappa (1981), which subtracts a chance agreement term based on the number of coding categories in the 
                                                 
1
 The last of General Pershing’s casualty reports was published in early August 1919, with the final casualty 
figures published in the Times on February 8, 1920.  
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content variable being tested. We also calculated Krippendorff’s alpha (2004), which corrects for 
multiple sources of chance agreement within a covariance framework across multiple coders.2 All 
content variables used in this analysis achieved acceptable levels of intercoder reliability, achieving at 
least a .70 level of reliability with either kappa or alpha, as appropriate. 
To maximize the validity of the content analysis data, we not only tested for chance-corrected 
intercoder reliability prior to data collection but also randomized the assignment of coders to stories 
during data collection. Coders were assigned to every fifth story in sequence within each war to ensure 
that any remaining coding error would distribute randomly across sampled days and that any single 
day’s coding was done by more than one person. As a result, war coverage in 144 of 154 sampled days 
was analyzed by all five coders (the remaining 10 days had fewer than five war stories to code). Coders 
were also assigned to begin their analysis in different wars and to proceed in chronological order so that 
any idiosyncratic errors would distribute evenly across wars. This additional validity check ensures that 
trends within and across wars are not merely artifacts of the coder assignment process.  
Details on the Coding of the Likelihood of Victory Variable 
The perceived likelihood of eventual victory is a central variable in the war support literature, but 
operationalizing this concept from news discourse proved challenging because of its potential relevance 
to a wide range of cues signaling the progress of a war. Five coding categories were developed to 
capture different types of information relevant to the likely outcome of a war: the apparent military 
power of enemy forces, the apparent military power of allied forces, a measure of which side had the 
military initiative, a measure assessing which side was likely to win the war, and a measure of whether 
the story contained mostly good news or bad news for the United States and its allies. Separate coding 
variables were collected using these five measures, but a principal components analysis later revealed a 
single-factor solution with strong loads for all five items (Eigenvalue = 2.86). As a consequence, we 
scaled all five variables to a common metric (after reverse coding the enemy strength variable) and 
averaged them into an aggregated estimate of the war’s likely outcome (Cronbach’s alpha = .81). This 
combined measure of the war’s anticipated result runs from –1 to 1, with negative values representing 
an anticipated defeat and positive values indicating a likely victory. The details on each category are 
detailed below, and we have included coding examples where appropriate. 
U.S./Allied Military Power 
Five possible categories: U.S./Allied very strong; U.S./Allied somewhat strong; Neither 
strong nor weak; U.S./Allied somewhat weak; U.S./Allied very weak. 
We judged the relative strength of the United States based on the depiction of the forces in 
the article. Often, this meant that the strength variable was linked to the outcome variable, although 
there was not a 1 to 1 correlation between these variables. We coded the strength of forces based on 
description of the relative size and capabilities of forces as well as the fortitude of the soldiers 
involved (if the article made special mention of this).  
 U.S./Allies Very Strong (06/03/1944) – “VAST AIR FLEETS SMASH AT EUROPE. […] 
The mighty Allied air fleets struck staggering blows Thursday night, yesterday and last night at 
numerous points on the edges of Hitler’s European fortress, hitting railroads, bridges and radio 
stations.” This story uses adjectives to qualify the power of the Allied forces as “mighty.” It also 
highlights that the ample damage in the communication systems is inflicted nearby Hitler’s position. 
 U.S./Allied Somewhat Strong (02/25/1944) - “[…] 8th Loses 49 Bombers Fells 37 of Foe - 
15
th
 Bags 29 More. The largest number of planes ever dispatched against Germany pulverized 
industrial targets in Schweinfurt, Gotha and Steyr, Austria, yesterday when the United States Eighth 
                                                 
2
 To calculate Krippendorff’s alpha, we used the “kalphav2_0.sps” SPSS macro developed by Andrew Hayes 
at Ohio State University. 
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Air Force based in Britain and the United States 15th Air Force stationed in Italy joined to attack 
the Reich simultaneously from the west and south.” Whereas this story also portrays a mighty force 
displayed (comparing it to the former illustration), the difference stems from the fact that in this 
case losses are reported, namely: 49 bombers in the headlines. Thus, the said report makes a nuance 
in the report and made this story a candidate for the “somewhat strong” rather than the “very 
strong” category. 
Neither strong nor weak – category was coded when no reference was made to the strength of 
the Allies.  
U.S./Allies somewhat weak (1/16/1941) – “The war in the Mediterranean and upon its shores 
has entered a new phase, the British communiqué on Monday revealed. For the first time German 
armed forces have struck a damaging blow against the British in the Mediterranean area.” The story 
if coded as U.S./Allies being “somewhat weak” rather than “very weak” due to the fact that German 
forces were able to inflict damaging blow only for the first time.  
U.S./Allies very weak (2/28/1945) “U-BOAT BAD UP, FOE CLAIMS February Sinking Are 
Said to Total 333,400 Tons. The Germans declare today that increased U-boat warfare and torpedo 
plane attacks in February sank fifty-seven Allied merchantmen, twenty-seven destroyers and other 
escorts and two light cruisers.” The Allies are coded as very weak in this story due to the 
mentioning of only allied losses.  
Enemy Military Power 
Five possible categories: Enemy very strong; Enemy somewhat strong; Neither strong nor 
weak; Enemy somewhat weak; Enemy very weak. 
The same set of rules originated for the U.S./Allied Strength apply. 
Military Initiative 
 Five possible categories: U.S./Allied offensive or operation; U.S./Allied attack; Stalemate; 
Enemy Attack; Enemy offensive or operation. 
 Military initiative was divided into five categories; the key distinction rests on who 
conducted the action, and how extensive or large the action was. The first check was to determine 
whether or not one actor clearly conducted an attack. If both enemy and allied forces were 
conducting military operations, the tone was coded as “stalemate.” Additionally, the absence of any 
military action was also coded as stalemate. 
 Once the military actor was established, the article was coded as an offensive or an attack. 
Offensives or operations consisted of multiple attacks over a wide front, typically involving more 
than one military unit or multiple branches of the armed forces. Cues such as the nature of the 
military action, the number of units involved, and whether or not the action took place over a large 
geographic space were considered when making the offensive/attack distinction. For example, a 
firefight between two units on a stable front would be coded as an attack, whereas a series of attacks 
by multiple units across a wide area against an enemy target would be coded as an offensive. 
U.S./Allied Attack (02/13/1915) – “FRENCH RAID AIRSHIP CAMP. Bombs Dropped by 
Airmen on German Aerodrome in Alsace. […] Five French aviators dropped bombs today on the 
German military aerodrome at Habsheim, a town on the outskirts of Mulhausen, Alsace.” From the 
text it is clear that the French initiated this military action and that the said action was conducted by 
a single unit and directed towards a single target. 
U.S./Allied Offensive or Operation (08/27/1914) – “Main Army Headed for Posen […] the 
Russian Chief of Staff announces that since Sunday the Russian invasion of Galicia and Prussia has 
continued uninterruptedly along a wide front.” The text is clear in that Russians initiated an 
invasion and points out that the said invasion is directed towards two different regions; the 
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operations embrace a “wide front,” thus this is considered an offensive rather than an isolated 
attack. 
Enemy Attack (09/14/1916) – “[…] Thirteen Zeppelin airships took part in the raid over the 
eastern counties (of London) last night, and an official statement issued this afternoon says it was 
the most formidable attack by air ever made on England. Only three of the Zeppelins were able to 
approach the outskirts of London.” The story allows identifying whose initiative the bombardment 
is and that, though directed to several counties, the said military action has only one target: London. 
Thus, this story was coded as an attack. 
Enemy Offensive or Operation (06/28/1915) – “RUSSIAN ARMIES AGAIN RETREAT. 
Give Way North and South of Lemberg Under Austro-German Hammering. BAYONET BATTLE 
IN POLAND. New German Drive at Warsaw After Terrific Artillery Action Met with Cold Steel. 
[…] The Russians are again retreating in Galicia, both to the north and south of Lemberg, and in 
Poland the Germans have launched another attack upon Warsaw in the form of a drive from the 
north through Przasnysz.” In this case, both the “Austro-German Hammering” and the “New 
German Drive” suggest a coordinated military action on two different fronts, one in Russia (Galicia 
– now Ukraine) and one in Poland (Warsaw). Thus, two different units displaying military actions 
on two different targets made this story a candidate for the “Enemy Offensive” category.   
Likely Outcome 
Five possible categories: Enemy almost certain to win; Enemy likely to win; No clear likely 
outcome; U.S./Allies are likely to win; U.S./Allies are almost certain to win.  
An important distinction had to be made between “almost certain” and “likely to win” 
categories. Consistent successful attacks and complete surrender of the enemy were treated as 
“almost certain win.” In several articles, particularly in World War I, there was often no clear victor 
in a particular battle or campaign. We coded these articles as “No clear likely outcome.” If both 
sides were making considerable advances and thus each had a clear chance of winning the article 
was also coded as “No clear likely outcome.” 
Enemy almost certain to win (6/28/1915) – “The Russians are again retreating in Galicia, 
both to the north and south of Limberg, and in Poland the Germans have launched another attack 
upon Warsaw in the form of a drive from the north though Przasnysz.” This story portrays the 
U.S./Allied forces as consistently retreating whereas German forces continue to launch numerous 
successful attacks thus qualifying this article as an example of enemy being “almost certain to win.”  
Enemy likely to win (8/27/1914) – “Capt. Boy-Ed, naval Attaché of the German Embassy 
in Washington, who is now temporary stationed in New York, issues a statement yesterday in which 
he said, among other things, that the German successes in the present war had been belittled: that 
despite reports to the contrary Liego was in complete German control within six days after the 
German mobilization was ordered…” This story points out that the success of Germany might have 
been belittle thus suggesting that the enemy is likely to win. The difference between the previous 
example stems from the fact that in this present story success of the enemy is reported in only one 
case. 
U.S./Allies are likely to win (11/18/1915) – “[…] In the Adige Valley during the morning 
of the 14
th
 we enlarged and strengthen the position we occupy on the steep hill which slopes down 
from Zugna Torta toward Rovereto on the left bank of the leno de Vallersa torrent. The enemy 
immediately opened a violent artillery fire from Monto Ghella and launched an infantry attack, but 
was repulsed. In the Paora Valley enemy detachment tried to approach our positions were beaten 
off, leaving a number of prisoners in our hands.” This story was coded as “U.S./Allies are likely to 
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win” due to the fact that the enemy did not give up completely, as opposed to the example below, 
and attempted to launch a number of attacks, although unsuccessful.  
U.S./Allies are almost certain to win (8/27/1914) – “TOGOLAND IS SURRENDED. 
German Give Up Unconditionally After Asking for Terms. It was announced officially tonight that 
German Togoland had suffered unconditionally. The Allies will enter Kamina tomorrow morning.” 
Complete and unconditional withdrawal of German troops in this story indicates that “U.S./Allies 
are almost certain to win.”  
Good News/Bad News: 
 Good news/bad news determinations were made from the perspective of the United States 
and Allied forces. If the news was positive for U.S. and Allied forces, the variable was coded as 
“good news.” Conversely, negative news was coded “bad news.” If the lead paragraph and headline 
contained both positive and negative news items, the variable was coded as “a mix of good news 
and bad news.” Additionally, lead paragraphs and headlines that did not have a clear threshold for 
positive or negative news fell into the middle category. 
 We made positive and negative news determinations by studying the immediate gains and 
losses discussed by the headline and lead paragraph of the article. Thus, the determination was 
made in the context of the event discussed by the article. If both gains and losses for U.S. and Allied 
forces were present in the article, the news content was considered “mixed.” For the most part, the 
short-term focus of the good news/bad news measure, as well as the limited amount of information 
conveyed by headlines and lead paragraphs, made good news and bad news rare categories. 
Mostly Good News (06/27/1966) – “ENEMY NEAR HUE HIT FROM 4 SIDES. 48 of Foe 
Reported Killed in Diamond-Shaped Area. […] United States marines and South Vietnamese troops 
from four sides battered yesterday in a new operation in the marshy flatlands north of Hue.” These 
headlines and lead paragraph display a unidirectional story: the enemy was under fire and all the 
losses occurred on their side. Thus, this story is a nice illustration for the “mostly good news” 
category. 
Mix of Good News and Bad News (02/29/1968) – “U.S. REAPPRAISING ITS USE OF 
TROOPS IN VIETNAM WAR Westmoreland Said to Seek 100,000 to 200,000 More- Wheeler 
Briefs Johnson. […] High Government officials said today that the Johnson Administration was 
making a reappraisal of American military strategy in Vietnam. The reports came amid indications 
that Gen. William C. Westmoreland was seeking 100,000 to 200,000 more troops for the war 
effort.” These headlines and lead paragraph do not convey the sense of clarity the former illustration 
provides. In this case, the “reappraisal” part of the story can be taken as bad news, however the 
consideration of sending more troops can be interpreted as both good and bad news. Therefore, this 
story is a nice illustration for the “mixed news” category. 
 Mostly Bad News (08/18/1964) – “VIETCONG BATTER 2 HAMLETS AND AMUSH 
RELIEF FORCE. South Vietnam Casualties at 117 in One of the Worst Setbacks in Weeks. […] A 
pro-Communist battalion smashed two Government posts in the Mekong River delta late yesterday, 
ambushed a relief force and inflicted 117 casualties in Government troops.” This story, at the other 
end of the spectrum, is also a unidirectional story: the enemy, the Vietcong, inflicted all the pain 
without any reported losses (at least neither in the headlines nor in the lead paragraph) on their side. 
This is a clear example of a “mostly bad news” category.  
 7 
Alternative Modeling of Casualty Coverage 
The first three tables model the appearance of casualties in individual news stories, showing 
models for individual wars as well as the pooled models that combine wars. The dependent variable in 
Tables A2-A4 is whether or not an individual story mentioned American casualties. The pooled models 
in Table A2 are the same as those reported the paper’s Table 1, except with coefficients shown for the 
war-specific dummy variables (these coefficients were omitted from the paper’s Table 1). Table A3 
shows the models with story-level rather than day-level variables. Table A4 represents a combined 
model with both story and day variables included. This model is affected by the collinearity between 
story and day level variables regarding tone and content, but it still returns the same basic findings as in 
the other models. The dependent variable in Table A5 is the proportion of stories within each day 
containing mentions of American casualties, broken down by individual wars. The dependent variable in 
Table A6 is whether American deaths are mentioned at all on a given day (1 = mentioned, 0 = not 
mentioned). Taken together, these tables demonstrate that the findings reported in the paper generally 
hold for individual wars modeled separately from the others, although the smaller number of 
observations in these war-specific models (which are individual stories in Tables A2-A4 and sampled 
days in Table A5) means that these relationships sometimes fail to attain conventional levels of 
statistical significance when the wars are modeled separately. More generally, the alternative 
specifications in Tables A2-A5 all support the same conclusions as those reported in the paper, 
demonstrating that our findings are robust to different modeling choices (measuring casualty mentions 
at the story-level versus day-level; using story-level controls for combat descriptions and eventual 
likelihood of victory versus day-level measures only, etc.). 
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Table A1. Intercoder Reliability Statistics for Content Variables Used in the Analysis 
  
 
 
Type (# of 
Categories) 
 
Average 
Pairwise 
Agreement/ 
Correlation 
 
Minimum 
Pairwise 
Agreement/ 
Correlation 
 
Brennan 
and 
Prediger’s 
kappa
a 
 
 
Krippen- 
dorff’s 
alpha
b 
 
      
Mentions American Deadc 
 
Nominal (2) 91.2% 86.8% .736 .708 
Mentions Cumulative U.S. Deadd Nominal (2) 91.7% … .833 .721 
Mentions Numeric Trends in U.S. 
Deadd 
Nominal (2) 97.4% … .948 .814 
Mentions Combat Operationsc 
 
Nominal (2) 86.5% 74.2% .484 .738 
Likelihood of Victoryc Interval .797 .704 … .771 
      
a
 Intercoder reliability calculated from minimum pairwise agreement 
b
 Intercoder reliability measured as chance-corrected covariance 
c
 Each cell reports results based on parallel coding across five coders of all 161 stories included in the 
initial reliability test. 
d
 Each cell reports results based on parallel coding across two coders of all 192 stories mentioning 
American dead. 
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Table A2. Predicting Mentions of American Deaths in War-Related Newspaper Stories Using Only Day-Level 
Victory and Combat Variables 
 Models for Separate Wars  Pooled Models 
  
 
WWI 
 
 
WWII 
 
 
Korea 
 
 
Vietnam 
 
 
Iraq 
  
 
All Wars 
 
WWI and 
WWII 
Korea, 
Vietnam, 
Iraq 
 
 
Elapsed Time Since Start Of 
U.S. Involvement (Years) 
 
3.12† 
(1.78) 
 
.62 
(.42) 
 
-.17 
(.31) 
 
-.06 
(.06) 
 
.07 
(.16) 
  
-.05 
(.05) 
 
.64* 
(.32) 
 
-.06 
(.05) 
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In 
Past 30 Days (100s) 
-.044 
(.054) 
-.002 
(.005) 
-.004 
(.032) 
.001 
(.024) 
.98 
(.71) 
 .004† 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.004) 
-.008 
(.016) 
Trend In Marginal American 
Deaths (–1, 0, +1) 
-1.67 
(1.43) 
.12 
(.24) 
-.20 
(.30) 
.10 
(.15) 
-.41 
(.28) 
 .04 
(.09) 
.09 
(.19) 
.04 
(.10) 
Daily Average Likelihood Of 
Victory (–1 - +1)  
-1.13 
(6.63) 
-5.24 
(4.07) 
-1.37 
(3.13) 
-3.57 
(2.17) 
-4.97* 
(1.80) 
 -3.14* 
(.89) 
-3.89† 
(2.05) 
-3.44* 
(1.07) 
Daily Proportion Of Stories 
Describing Combat Ops (0-1) 
2.36 
(4.27) 
-2.51 
(2.26) 
1.31 
(2.57) 
1.47 
(1.04) 
7.59* 
(2.15) 
 1.50* 
(.66) 
-2.47 
(1.60) 
2.42* 
(.72) 
WWII       -.75* 
(.35) 
-.75† 
(.40) 
 
Korea       -.46 
(.40) 
  
Vietnam       -.03 
(.33) 
 .41 
(.32) 
Iraq       .46 
(.35) 
 .85* 
(.34) 
Constant 
 
-12.46* 
(5.37) 
-3.40* 
(1.44) 
-2.38* 
(.66) 
-2.14* 
(.45) 
-3.76* 
(.96) 
 -2.18* 
(.41) 
-2.91* 
(1.15) 
-2.72* 
(.36) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-49.4 -157.2 -63.6 -184.7 -166.8  -637.0* -209.3* -419.9* 
Pseudo R2 
 
.05 .04 .01 .02 .06  .05 .04 .04 
N = 160 737 214 509 357  1977 897 1080 
† p < .10  * p < .05 
Note: cells contain logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table A3. Predicting Mentions of American Deaths in War-Related Newspaper Stories Using Only Story-Level 
Victory and Combat Variables 
  
Models for Separate Wars 
  
Pooled Models 
  
 
WWI 
 
 
WWII 
 
 
Korea 
 
 
Vietnam 
 
 
Iraq 
  
 
All Wars 
 
WWI and 
WWII 
Korea, 
Vietnam, 
Iraq 
 
 
Elapsed Time Since Start Of 
U.S. Involvement (Years) 
 
3.59† 
(1.87) 
 
.08 
(.28) 
 
-.14 
(.29) 
 
-.04 
(.07) 
 
-.01 
(.14) 
  
-.03 
(.05) 
 
.28 
(.26) 
 
-.04 
(.06) 
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In 
Past 30 Days (100s) 
-.046 
(.031) 
.002 
(.004) 
.004 
(.027) 
.014 
(.026) 
-.59 
(.49) 
 .003 
(.002) 
-.000 
(.004) 
-.008 
(.016) 
Trend In Marginal American 
Deaths (–1, 0, +1) 
-1.85 
(1.48) 
-.14 
(.20) 
-.24 
(.29) 
.18 
(.16) 
.20 
(.19) 
 .01 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.18) 
.04 
(.10) 
Story-Level Likelihood Of 
Victory  (–1 - +1) 
-2.40* 
(.91) 
-.94* 
(.41) 
-.06 
(.87) 
-.61 
(.56) 
-2.77* 
(.72) 
 -1.24* 
(.25) 
-1.24* 
(.37) 
-1.33* 
(.37) 
Story Describes Combat Ops 
(1, 0) 
1.44* 
(.58) 
1.01* 
(.33) 
.45 
(.54) 
2.56* 
(.31) 
1.25* 
(.35) 
 1.52* 
(.16) 
1.10* 
(.28) 
1.72* 
(.20) 
WWII       -.80* 
(.36) 
-.89* 
(.41) 
 
Korea       -.14 
(.40) 
  
Vietnam       .36 
(.31) 
 .50 
(.33) 
Iraq       .96* 
(.32) 
 1.03* 
(.34) 
Constant 
 
-13.72* 
(5.67) 
-3.73* 
(.98) 
-2.33* 
(.58) 
-2.90* 
(.41) 
-1.43* 
(.50) 
 -2.72* 
(.35) 
-3.49* 
(.94) 
-2.82* 
(.33) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-43.4* -156.5 -63.4 -149.7* -160.7*  -594.2* -203.2* -388.3* 
Pseudo R2 
 
.01 .05 .01 .21 .09  .11 .07 .11 
N = 160 737 214 509 357  1977 897 1080 
† p < .10  * p < .05 
Note: cells contain logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table A4. Predicting Mentions of American Deaths in War-Related Newspaper Stories Using Both Day- and 
Story-Level Victory and Combat Variables 
  
Models for Separate Wars 
  
Pooled Models 
  
 
WWI 
 
 
WWII 
 
 
Korea 
 
 
Vietnam 
 
 
Iraq 
  
 
All Wars 
 
WWI and 
WWII 
Korea, 
Vietnam, 
Iraq 
 
 
Elapsed Time Since Start Of 
U.S. Involvement (Years) 
 
3.44† 
(1.90) 
 
.65 
(.42) 
 
-.17 
(.30) 
 
-.06 
(.07) 
 
.08 
(.16) 
  
-.04 
(.05) 
 
.68* 
(.32) 
 
-.06 
(.06) 
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In 
Past 30 Days (100s) 
-.053 
(.057) 
-.002 
(.005) 
-.004 
(.032) 
.005 
(.026) 
.974 
(.739) 
 .004* 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.004) 
-.010 
(.016) 
Trend In Marginal American 
Deaths (–1, 0, +1) 
-1.82 
(1.53) 
.13 
(.24) 
-.20 
(.30) 
.12 
(.17) 
-.41 
(.29) 
 .04 
(.09) 
.11 
(.20) 
.04 
(.10) 
Daily Average Likelihood Of 
Victory (–1 - +1)  
1.55 
(7.11) 
-4.68 
(4.15) 
-1.43 
(3.31) 
-4.27 
(2.63) 
-2.70 
(1.96) 
 -2.08* 
(.97) 
-3.01 
(2.11) 
-2.53* 
(1.22) 
Story-Level Likelihood Of 
Victory  (–1 - +1) 
-2.42* 
(.92) 
-.73† 
(.42) 
.05 
(.92) 
-.14 
(.61) 
-2.78* 
(.78) 
 -1.03* 
(.27) 
-1.06* 
(.38) 
-1.00* 
(.40) 
Daily Proportion Of Stories 
Describing Combat Ops (0-1) 
1.15 
(4.56) 
-3.81 
(2.32) 
.88 
(2.65) 
-1.53 
(1.23) 
6.76* 
(2.26) 
 -.20 
(.72) 
-3.76* 
(1.66) 
.59 
(.80) 
Story Describes Combat Ops 
(1, 0) 
1.44* 
(.59) 
1.27* 
(.34) 
.41 
(.56) 
2.75* 
(.33) 
1.06* 
(.36) 
 1.56* 
(.17) 
1.27* 
(.29) 
1.70* 
(.21) 
WWII       -.80* 
(.36) 
-.77† 
(.41) 
 
Korea       -.42 
(.42) 
  
Vietnam       .03 
(.34) 
 .44 
(.33) 
Iraq       .59 
(.37) 
 .94* 
(.35) 
Constant 
 
-13.83* 
(5.72) 
-3.65* 
(1.47) 
-2.38 
(.67) 
-2.61* 
(.52) 
-3.95* 
(1.00) 
 -2.39* 
(.43) 
-3.21* 
(1.18) 
-2.89* 
(.38) 
Log Likelihood 
 
-43.3* -149.3* -63.3 -146.7* -155.9*  -591.2* -196.9* -386.1* 
Pseudo R2 
 
.17 .09 .01 .22 .12  .12 .10 .12 
N = 160 737 214 509 357  1977 897 1080 
† p < .10  * p < .05 
Note: cells contain logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table A5. Predicting the Daily Proportion (0-1) of War-Related Stories Mentioning American Deaths 
 
  
Models for Separate Wars 
  
Pooled Models 
  
 
WWI 
 
 
WWII 
 
 
Korea 
 
 
Vietnam 
 
 
Iraq 
  
 
All Wars 
 
WWI and 
WWII 
Korea, 
Vietnam, 
Iraq 
 
 
Elapsed Time Since Start Of 
U.S. Involvement (Years) 
 
 
.24* 
(.09) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
-.01 
(.04) 
 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
-.02 
(.03) 
  
-.01 
(.01) 
 
.04 
(.02) 
 
-.01 
(.01) 
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In 
Past 30 Days (100s) 
 
-.004 
(.003) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.004) 
-.003 
(.004) 
.25† 
(.13) 
 .000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.003 
(.002) 
Trend In Marginal American 
Deaths (–1, 0, +1) 
 
-.14 
(.07) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.03) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.09† 
(.05) 
 .01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
Daily Average Likelihood Of 
Victory (–1 - +1)  
 
-.02 
(.33) 
-.16 
(.17) 
-.01 
(.35) 
-.69* 
(.27) 
-1.11* 
(.40) 
 -.47* 
(.14) 
-.25* 
(.11) 
-.63* 
(.19) 
Daily Proportion Of Stories 
Describing Combat Ops (0-1) 
 
.35 
(.26) 
-.13 
(.10) 
-.05 
(.26) 
.30* 
(.13) 
1.21* 
(.38) 
 .27* 
(.09) 
-.05 
(.09) 
.32* 
(.11) 
WWII       -.06 
(.06) 
-.07 
(.02) 
 
Korea       -.07 
(.06) 
  
Vietnam       .01 
(.05) 
 .06 
(.05) 
Iraq       .05 
(.06) 
 .08 
(.05) 
Constant 
 
-.74* 
(.26) 
.06 
(.07) 
.12 
(.09) 
.13* 
(.06) 
-.18 
(.16) 
 .12† 
(.06) 
.05 
(.07) 
.07 
(.05) 
          
R2 
 
.77 .38 .06 .30 .41  .27 .42 .27 
N = 10 20 18 49 29  125 30 95 
† p < .10  * p < .05 
Note: cells contain unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table A6. Predicting Days in Which At Least One War-Related Story Mentioned 
American Deaths 
 
  
Pooled Models 
  
All Wars 
 
WWI and WWII 
Korea, Vietnam, 
Iraq 
 
 
Elapsed Time Since Start Of U.S. 
Involvement (Years) 
 
 
-.14 
(.16) 
 
-.40 
(1.73) 
 
-.14 
(.17) 
Marginal # Of U.S. Deaths In Past 30 Days 
(100s) 
 
.03 
(.02) 
.05 
(.07) 
.02 
(.06) 
Trend In Marginal American Deaths (–1, 0, 
+1) 
 
.56† 
(.29) 
-.14 
(.89) 
.62† 
(.32) 
Daily Average Likelihood Of Victory (–1 - 
+1)  
 
-5.94* 
(2.97) 
-4.63 
(7.87) 
-5.90† 
(3.42) 
Daily Proportion Of Stories Describing 
Combat Ops (0-1) 
 
-3.42† 
(1.91) 
-7.27 
(6.22) 
-2.96 
(2.11) 
WWII -.71 
(1.35) 
 
-1.56 
(1.89) 
 
Korea -2.57* 
(1.30) 
 
  
Vietnam -1.48 
(1.27) 
 
 1.06 
(.87) 
Iraq -2.11 
(1.38) 
 
 .37 
(.90) 
Constant 
 
4.39* 
(1.47) 
6.88 
(5.48) 
1.83† 
(.96) 
    
Log Likelihood 
 
-50.6* -9.8 -40.3* 
Pseudo R2 
 
.17 .27 .15 
N = 125 30 95 
† p < .10  * p < .05 
Note: cells contain logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Separate 
models for individual wars are not reported due to overdetermination caused by the truncated 
dependent variable and the small number of cases. 
 
